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An inverse association is generally observed between inequality in the 
size distribution of personal incomes and the level of per capita income in 
a country (Kuznets, 1955). Several aspects of the demographic composition of 
populations may account for this association between economic development and 
aggregate income inequality. In the long run, modern economic growth may 
contribute to changing death and birth rates and social organization, which 
in turn modify the age structure of the population and the composition and 
size distribution of families. If a substantial share of aggregate income in­
equality is linked to these demographic features of populations, a decomposi-
tion of income inequality based on these features might help to understand 
the pro~imate origins of trends and cross sectional patterns in aggregate in­
equality. Moreover, it may be argued that the inequality associated with 
certain demographic features, such as the age structure, is not necessarily an 
indication of the degree of lifetime inequality among persons, and may, there­
fore, be tentatively excluded from welfare comparisons of economic inequality. 
Thus, the causal origins and the normative significance of aggregate inequality 
may be clarified by such decompositions. 
This paper reports two approaches to decompose income inequality, ap­
proximated by the variance of the logarithms of income (log variance), into 
components associated, first, with the age structure of individuals with income, 
and second, by the number of adults and children (per adult) in families. 
l 
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First,data for three countries are used to illustrate how variation 
in age structures may help to account for observed patterns of aggregate 
income inequality. The data for Colombia are then analyzed further to explore 
the relationship between family composition and family income. Two elements 
of family composition are distinguished--fertility and the decision of adults 
to share living arrangements. The number of children that parents want 
may respond to incomes, relative prices, and wage rates of parents; the rela­
tionship between fertility and adult incomes can be interpreted, in this context, 
as a simple demand equation, albeit one that is subject to bias by the omission 
of other factors affecting reproductive demands that are probably correlated 
with adult incomes. The propensity of adults to live together may be interpreted 
similarly as a choice of adults that is conditioned by their economic resources. 
It may alternatively be viewed as a production relationship linking the pro­
ductive contributions of adult workers, who contribute differentially with the 
growth of family scale, to total family income. These static decompositions 
of income inequality provide suggestive explanations for how economic develop­
ment may affect over tinethe distribution of personal incomes, and how the 
path of demographic transition modifies the rate of income growth and its 
personal distribution across a society and within a society across generations. 
3 
AGE STRUCTURE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME 
The age structures of populations differ substantially from country to country 
and within a single country over time. These differences reflect the level 
of and predominantly recent changes in birth and death rates. High birth 
rates yield a younger age structure in the long run, and low birth rates an 
older structure. Recent sharp declines in mortality rates in low income 
countries have been larger among infants and children than they have been 
for adults. This has had a similar effect on the age structure of these 
populations as would an increase in fertility, namely, increasing the rate 
of growth of the youngest age groups relative to older age groups. Most low 
income countries, therefore, have experienced a shift in their age structure, 
after World War II, with the share of children increasing.· These relatively 
large surviving birth cohorts from the post-war period have in the 197Os 
entered the labor force and begun to earn income. In those countries that 
have experienced declines in fertility, the proportion of the population in 
the youngest age groups has, conversely, fallen and in time the age structure 
of the labor force will tend to become older. 
The secular decline in mortality rates in high income countries has 
exerted a less pronounced effect on the age structure of these populations, 
because mortality was already in this century at a lower level and the de­
cline was more uniformly distributed across age groups. But notable long 
swings in birth rates occurred in some high income countries, such as the 
United States after the 192Os, and perturbed age-structures. The rise in 
birth rates following World War II created a relatively large birth cohort 
to be absorbed into the labor force in the 197Os, whereas the Great De-
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pression produced a shortfall in births and thus a relatively small cohort 
of labor force entrants to satisfy the growth in labor demands in the 1950s. 
Given the current variation across countries in age structures and our 
capacity to project future swings in these structures, it would seem useful 
to assess how age structures affect, directly and indirectly, the distribution 
of personal income, and how aggregate economic developments and individual 
behavior respond to and modify these effects of the age structure on measured 
income "inequality." 
The Logarithmic Variance of Personal Incomes and Its Decomposition by Age 
Several measures of inequality can be decomposed into elements asso­
ciated with a particular population characteristic; the log variance can 
be resolved, as any variance can, into between and within group variance 
components as reported below. l Such decompositions are insightful if they 
distinguish between different sources of inequality with different implica­
tions for economic welfare or policy and if they clarify empirical regulari­
ties that can be interpreted as camal relationships. 
The analysis in this section of the paper focuses on individual 
money incomes. Our aggregate measure of economic inequality, the log vari­
ance, V(y), is resolved into three portions associated with (1) the age 
structure of the income recipient population, (2) the profile of incomes 
received on average by persons of different ages, and (3) the income in­
equality within these different age groups. 
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(1) 
where is the natural logarithm of the i th individual in the j th age 
group with a positive income in the preceding time period, yj is the mean 
of of logarithmic incomes in the j th age group, y is the overall mean of 
logarithmic incomes, nj is the number of persons of age j with a positive 
income, and thus N = tnj. 
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The Age Structure 
The first term, nj/N, is the weight or relative frequency of the age 
groups in the population of income recipients and can modify measured aggre­
gate income inequality without necessarily affecting lifetime income oppor­
tunities of individuals. Intertemporal or cross country comparisons may 
be confounded by differences in age structure, and few empirical studies of 
income inequality have attempted to isolate or remove this demographic 
source of measured inequality. As with index numbers, there is no streight­
forward method to normalize adequately for variation in quantity weights 
(i.e., age structure), because the other two components of income inequali­
ty are likely to differ across observations. The broad variations in income 
inequality that are empirically documented generally parallel variation in 
age structures; though many other factors are probably involved in generating 
these patterns in inequality, the effects of age structure warrant further 
quantitative analysis. 
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For example, if a large fraction of young workers in a population 
increases meastred aggregate income inequality, as appears to be the case in 
the United States, several empirical regularities first noted by Kuznets 
(1955, 1963) might be explained by variation in age structures. (1) In 
the advanced stages of industrialization and urbanization, particularly in 
the 20th century, a number of countries, including the United States, evi­
dence declining income inequality. This pattern of change in inequality 
over time is consistent with the changes in age structure that accompanied 
the secular decline in fertility in these countries during this period. 
(2) Low income countries report today greater income inequality, by most 
summary measures, than do high income industrially advanced countries. 
Less developed countries have recently sustained higher levels of fertility 
than have the more developed countries and their consequent younger age structures 
could explain this cross country pattern in income inequality. (3) Some data 
suggest that inequality increased during the early stages of industrialization 
in the United States (Lindert and Williamson, 1976), and may also have increased 
recently in some low income countries, such as India. The earlier noted shifts 
in age structure in many low income countries stemming from the age pattern of 
mortality declines could account for some deterioration in measured income in­
equality in the current period. High fertility and immigration were sufficient 
in the United States to increase the ratio of men age 15 to 24 to all men 15 
or older until about 1820. This ratio, corresponding to the proportion of 
youthful entrants to the labor force, has declined steadily since that time 
in the United States, from 38 percent in 1820 to 24 percent by 1940 (U.S. Bureau 
of Census, 1960). 
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The Age-Income Profile 
The second component of income inequality in equation (1) is the 
difference between the age group logarithmic mean income and the overall 
population logarithmic mean income, squared. If equity is defined in terms 
of equality in the distribution of lifetime economic opportunities, appro­
priately discounted, then income differences by age need not represent 
inequitable variation in individual incomes, assuming of course that indi­
viduals experience the sequence of average incomes associated with each age 
interval in their lifetime. Individuals may decide to redistribute these 
earnings opportunities over their lifetime by means of investments in 
physical and human capital. According to this mechanism, age-earnings pro­
files are interpreted as a reflection of the level of schooling and post­
school training and occupational experience that individuals acquire at 
an initial cost in anticipation of subsequent gain (Mincer, 1974). 2 Since 
these human capital investments tend to be concentrated at the outset of the 
life cycle, the greater the general level of these investments or the more 
highly educated the population, the mor~ steeply upward sloping are age­
earnings longitudinal profiles for a birth cohort. The time individuals 
allocate to earning income also varies systematically with age, displacing 
the life cycle profile of earnings from that of wage rates or the economic 
gains obtained per unit time worked. 
But observations are not usually available on the income, earnings or 
wages of cohorts over their lifetime; rather, analysis typically relies on 
cross-sectional age groupings of a population at one time, from which a 
"synthetic" age-income profile is obtained. This cross-sectional (period) 
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age-earnings profile will differ from the longitudinal (cohort) age-earnings 
profile for two, possibly interrelated, reasons. First, different age 
groups in the cross section will tend to have different levels of education, 
and other productive qualifications. Yotmger age groups will in general 
have received more years of schooling than older age groups, with the conse­
quence that cross sectional age-earnings profiles will tend to increase more 
slowly with age, peak earlier, and decline more rapidly than would the cor-res­
ponding age-earnings profile from longitudinal data on individuals. In popula­
tions where the level of education has been increasing rapidly in recent 
decades, the covariance between age and education for workers will be large 
and negative. Cross sectional age-wage profiles for such populations will 
tend to be flatter at the younger ages than would be the case for a re­
presentative individual progressing through their life eye.le in these 
populations. 
Holding constant the educational qualifications and hours worked of 
the labor force, differences between longitudinal and cross sectional age­
earnings profiles may remain. This residual may be attributed to omitted pro­
ductive characteristics of the work force or secular growth (or decline) of 
labor productivity that workers capture due to physical capital accumulation 
and the growth in technical knowledge. If- this residual effect on the pro­
ductivity of labor is proportional in its impact on the earnings of workers 
at all ages, this age-neutral secular shift in productivity would contribute 
to further reducing the positive slope (or increasing the negative slope) of 
3the age earnings profile as observed in the cross section. 
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Within Age Group Inequality 
The third component of income inequality in equation (1) is the with­
in age group log variance. Some procedure is called for to summarize these 
measures of inequality over age groups to represent lifetime incomes. The 
cross-sectional decomposition suggests simply applying the current popula-
tion structure, nj/N, as weights, but this is inadequate if there are import­
ant sources of covariance between one time period and the next for individual 
incomes. Recent lifecycle econometric research has begun to estimate dynamic 
earnings models based on U.S. panel survey data. Persistent differences among 
individuals are characterized by permanent individual effects in these models, 
and transitory shocks to income are generally assumed to be serially correlated 
(e.g., Lillard and Willis, 1978). But shortage of panel data outside of the 
· U.S. and the limited agreement on statistical specification for these dynamic 
models has slowed progress toward empirical generalizations. Only cross sectional 
static summarizations of lifetime inequality are within the scope of this 
paper. 
Three Empirical Examples 
Table 1 reports the empirical cotmterparts for this decomposition for 
the Netherlands in 1950 for individual annual income recipients, the United 
States in 1970 for all male annual income recipients, and Colombia in 1973 
for all males with monthly money income. Column (1) reports the age structure 
of income recipients; column (2) the difference between the age group's 
average (log) income and that of the entire population, squared, with those 
age groups below the average showing a negative sign; and column (3) the with­
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between cohort components to the overall income inequality. If these values 
differ substantially by age group, then the earlier noted differences in age 
structures might help to explain variation in aggregate income inequality. 
Column (5) multiplies the age group's weight by its contribution to overall 
income inequality. 
In the case of the Netherlands, the contribution to inequality of the 
youngest age group, age 15 to 20 is greatest; this group represents less 
than a tenth of the population but accounts for 27 percent of overall income 
inequality (i.e., .173/.644 s .27). The increase in the population share of 
this young group in the decade after 1950 contributed to increasing measured 
income inequality in the Netherlands by 1959 (Schultz, 1965). 
The youngest age group is also the primary contributor to overall in­
come inequality in the United States, constituting again a tenth of the 
estimated total number of males with income but contributing 35 percent 
of the log variance (i.e ••42/1.19 = .35). The source of this inequality 
due to the youngest labor force entrants differs in the two countries, how­
ever. In the Netherlands persons age 15-20 receive substantially lower 
than average incomes, but these incomes are relatively equally distributed 
within the age group, whereas in the United States the level of income for 
young men age 14-19 is not only lower but the variance within the young 
age group is also larger than any other age group. In either case, swings 
in the proportion of the population in the youngest age group could influ­
ence measured income inequality, without necessarily implying any change 
in inequality in lifetime economic opportunities of persons in these soci­
eties. From this evidence for two high income countries there is support 
for the hypothesis that the slow tendency for income inequality to diminish 
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in industrially advanced countries in this century could be partially 
explained by their aging population structures. 
Monthly male income data from Colombia do not support the view that 
aggregate money income inequality is necessarily sensitive to changes in the 
age structure. The contrfbution to the total log variance attributable to 
each age group is nearly constant, as shown in Column (4). Though incomes 
are below average in the youngest age group, the difference is smaller than 
for the other two countries. Also, as in the Netherlands, the log variance 
of incomes within the youngest age groups is considerably smaller than with­
in the older age groups. 
In several respects the income data for Colombia differ from those 
available for the United States and the Netherlands. First, the Colombian 
sample is more restrictive with regard to employment status; domestic 
servants and tmpaid family workers are excluded because these workers tend to 
receive all or a substantial fraction of their income in kind, e.g., room and 
board, and youth are often found in these employment groups in Colombia. 
Unpaid family workers with no income are also excluded from the U.S. data, 
but they represent a far smaller share of the U.S. population. Second, 
income is measured in the Colombian Census over the preceding month rather 
than over a year. This convention could affect measured inequality and the 
composition of the sample of income recipients, particularly before age 25 
4when young men are entering the labor force and terminating their education. 
Educational achievement in Colombia has increased, perhaps more 
rapidly than it has in the United States and the Netherlands. But holding 
constant for educational attainment of workers does not consistently in­
crease the slope of the age-income profile, as postulated, because for the 
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two youngest age groups the men who report incomes tend to be those members 
of their cohort who have less than average levels of education. This selec­
tion bias leads to the result that the average education of the income 
Only after age 29 does the adjustmentrecipients increases until age 25-29. 
for the educational attainment of Colombian men increase the derivative of 
the income profile with respect to age. 
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Extrapolations of Age Structure Effects on Income Inequality 
A principle difference between the income data for the two high in­
come countries and Colombia is the relative insensitivity of measured 
overall income inequality in Colombia to the age structure. To
' 
illustrate 
this difference between the U.S. and Colombia, assume that the age-income 
profile and within age group inequality did not change from the 1970-73 
figures reported in Table 1. The actual change over time in the age 
structure of males in these two countries would then imply the estimates 
of the overall log variance of male incomes shown in Table 2. In the case 
of the United States, the gradual decline in fertility and decrease in im­
migration has had the effect of shifting the age structure of the population 
toward older ages, with the calculated effect of reducing the log variance 
of incomes from 1.57 in 1830 to 1.14 in 1950. Swings in birth rates since 
the depression have contributed subsequently to swings in the log variance 
of incomes, increasing ten percent from 1950 to 1960, decreasing 14 percent 
to 1980, and increasing again by ten percent by the year 2000. These are 
relatively large variations in measures of income inequality that are 





Extrapolations of the Log Variance of Personal Incomes· of Males 
over Age 14 for the United States and Colombia, 
Based on Changing Age Structures, 
and Assuming that Variance Components of Age Groups Do Not Change 
Year of Age ~tr~c:ure United States 1970 Colombia 1973 




1940 1.32 (1938) 1.78 
1950 1.14 (1951) 1.i7 
1960 1.25· (1964) 1.78 
-· - 1970 1.19 
. (1973) 1.80 
1980 1.07 -
1990 · 1.13* -(1993) 1.77** 
2900.. 1.17* -
•census Bureau Series II that assumes cohort fertility r3te stable· 
at 2.1 children per wocan. 
**Projected by author assuming Coale and Demeny (1966) West level 
18/19 tables applicable to males in two decades after 1973 Census and 
fertility continues to decline, but more slowly after 1973. Age group 
under 19 with income set equal to 2/3 of ages 15-19; age group with 
incomes over 55 set equal to ages 55-64 only. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960) and subsequent CPS 
publications on projections. Colombian Office of Statistics, 
DANE (1977). 
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In the case of Colombia, however, despite the destabilizing effect 
of the demographic transition on the population's age structure since the 
1940s, the estimated swings in the age structure from 1937 to 1993 have 
little effect on the calculated log variance of male incomes. If Colombia's 
age-income profile and within age group income inequality is closer to that 
in other low income countries than is that of the Netherlands and the United 
States, the change in age structures that has been produced by the demographic 
transition may not have been of itself a dominant factor in explaining 
variation and change in overall money income inequality in less developed 
countries among individuals. 
Large residual differences across countries remain in within age group 
income inequality. At about age 30, when continuing education and early 
labor force investments should be least important, the log variance of incomes 
is about .35 in the Netherlands, .45 in the United States among males, and 
1.6 in Colombia among males. If these differences are not due to differences 
in statistical sources, these are indeed large differences in lifetime inequality, 
as are those extrapolated for the United States over the century 1830 to 1950. 
Summing within age group inequality with population structure weights, i.e., 
t Col. (l)*Col. (3), this static measure of lifetime income inequality is 
.40 in the Netherlands, .65 in the United States, and 1.68 in Colombia. 
Conversely, lifecycle variation in income inequality approximated by deviations 
of the age-income profile from the average, i.e., t Col. (1)*Col. (2), account 
for 50 percent of the overall measure of income inequality in the U.S., 37 
percent in the Netherlands, but only 7 percent in Colombia. 
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Age Structure Effects on the Equilibrium Components of Income Inequality 
The form of static decomposition performed above focuses on only the 
direct effect of changes in age structure on income inequality. But the 
age structure also indirectly affects measured inequality by changing the 
age-income profile and by influencing within age group income inequality. 
Estimation of the incidence and magnitude of these indirect demographic 
effects calls for economic analysis of time series. The former case is 
. precisely the demographic-economic mechanism that Ronald Lee (1977) has 
explored to explain long swings in the relative income status of a sequence 
of U.S. birth cohorts of differing size. Relatively large (small) cohorts 




t~e cross sectional age-income profile. 
The institutional and technical mechanisms determining the adjustment 
of cohort earnings to cohort size remain \lllclear; do adjustments across 
age groups occur in wage rates or in hours worked;does the latter adjust­
ment come about through change in labor force participation rates, 
\lllemployment rates or average hours worked by the employed? Recent evi­
dence for the United States indicates that most of the adjustment of the 
labor market to the relatively large cohort entering the labor force in 
the 1970s occurred through adjustment of wage rates by age, but age­
specific unemployment rates and labor force participation rates also 
reacted to cohort size (Freeman, 1979; Welch, 1979). Further research is 
required to clarify whether cohort relative size imparts a persisting life­
time effect to the level of the cohort's longitudinal age-income profile, 
or whether cohort size primarily influences the cohort's starting wage, 
and that this initial effect subsequently wears off as members of the co­
hort obtain more job-related experience. 
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Macro economic indicators of the tightness of labor markets and the 
effect of such tightness on inflation were reconsidered in the 1970s as 
the labor force grew more rapidly and its age-sex composition changed. Real 
wage rates tended to deteriorate for youth with limited experience, and 
yet wages increased for older, more experienced male workers. The overall un­
employment rate increased, but this development did not curb inflationary 
pressures from some segments of the labor market. 
Finally, within age group income inequality may be affected by 
cohort relative size, other things being equal. Since tight labor markets 
are generally associated with diminished income inequality, within age group 
inequality is likely to diminish for relatively small cohorts, and widen for 
large cohorts. But evidence of the effect of cohort size on the cross 
sectional age-income profile and on within age group inequality is no more 
than suggestive at this time. Firm conclusions as to the magnitude and 
persistence of these effects of cohort size on the structure of income inequality 
in high and low income countries must await further research and probably analyses 
of longer time series than have been available to date. 
When younger groups in the labor force increase more rapidly than 
do others, the effect of increased cohort size of the new entrants is to 
augment overall measures of income inequality. This will occur until the 
rapidly growing age group's contribution to the overall log variance of 
incomes is no longer greater than average (Col. 4). This may occur between 
about age 25 and 35, depending on the slope of the age-income profile. As 
the growth of the labor force entering cohorts falls below the average for 
the population of income recipients, and the most rapid growth occurs in the 
middle age groups, the indirect effects of relative cohort size are likely 
18 
to reduce overall income inequality. The precise timing of this reversal 
-
depends on several as yet unquantified offsetting factors. 
In conclusion, the static decomposition illustrates how recent changes 
in the age structure of high income countries may explain secular trends and 
recent cycles in their measured income inequality. The importance of these 
direct age structure effects may be less marked in low income countries, at 
least this appears to be the case for Colombia in 1973. But the data for 
Colombia may overstate the relative income position of youth, because un­
paid family workers and other low productivity groups that are numerically 
important in Colombia are not observed as individual income recipients. 
Improved income data, corrections for selection ~ias,_a?d further analysis 
of the family as the production unit may clarify,som~ of these issues in low 
incom~ countries. 
Conversely, patterns of part-time employment and the inclusion of 
students and unemployed may understate the relative income position of youth 
in the United States and thus exaggerate the importance of youth in overall 
measures of inequality. If the U.S. decomposition of log variance is repeated 
for 1967, when earnings are reported from the U.S. Current Population Survey 
for full-time year-round working males, the age pattern and level of inequality 
is different from that for all males with income, but the finding stressed 
in this paper of the overall sensitivity of measured inequality to the age 
structure does not change. The relative income status of men age 14-19 improves 
(about doubles) and the within age group inequality diminishes, particularly 
for men age 20-24. But since the overall log variance of full-time year-round 
earnings is 60 percent less than that for all income recipients, the 
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total cohort contribution of youth age 14-19 (column 4, Table 1) remains about 
four times the overall average log variance, similar to that reported in 
Table 1 for all income recipients in 1970.(See summary and sources of data 
for 1967 in Schultz, 1975.) Although there are reasons to prefer measures 
of inequality based on wage rates or restricted to comparisons of persons 
working in the labor market the same amount of time, this is not a conunon 
practice and has not been the empirical basis for the widely observed relation­
ship between economic dev~lopment and income inequality (Kusnic and DaVanzo, 
1980; Schultz, 1981, Section D). 
Indirect dynamic effects of cohort relative size on cohort earnings 
and on within cohort inequality, possibly associated with the demographic 
transition, may also be responsible for increasing measured income inequality. 
Since these latter two effects of relative cohort size on income inequality 
have a clear bearing on inequality in lifetime income opportunities, they 
warrant more explicit study in which the direct effects of age structure are 
held constant. Data examined here relate to only three countries, each at 
only one time period. They do not provide more than an illustration of the 
proposed decomposition methodology. They do suggest, however, that there 
are substantial differences between countries in within age group inequality. 
They also imply that at least in high income countries changes in overall in­
equality may be strongly influenced by age structure shifts, both secular 
trends and long swings. Many standard interpretations of patterns in over­
all inequality may need to be revised when these salient effects of age 
structure are suitably identified and removed from the data. 
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FAMILY COMPOSITION AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
Two approaches to income inequality are found in the economics litera­
ture: one emphasizes the distribution of endowments and productive op­
portunities among individuals over their lifetimes, while the other treats 
income per family, adjusted somehow for its current consumption needs. The 
former is oriented toward understanding the determinants of earnings of pro­
ductive factors and their personal distribution, whereas the latter is 
concerned with the distribution of consumption and economic welfare. 
As an income recipient unit, families differ in size and composition, 
and some studies suggest that family composition responds to the economic 
endowments and opportunities of its potential members. Whereas the age 
structure of a population was previously interpreted as given and thus 
exogenously affecting the distrfbution of income aero$& individuals, it is 
not always reasonable to assume that the size ~nd composition of families is 
exogenously affecting the size distribution of family incomes. 
The second half of this paper explores how family income inequality 
might be approached with decomposition methods to clarify two distinct 
demographic processes that modify family size and composition: the propensity 
of adult to share living arrangements, and the level of surviving fertility 
per adult. 
One common procedure to normalize the distribution of income across 
families for family composition is to express the income of the family (or 
unrelated individual) in per capita terms.
6 This per capita family income 
measure of economic welfare,or consumption opportunities is adopted here for 
simple illustrative purposes. 
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A Framework for Study of Demands Underlying Family CompositionTwo·sources of variation in family size are conveniently distinguished:
the number of adults and number of children in the family. The number
of children (under age 15) per family is expressed per adult (age 15 or over)
in the family, and may be viewed as an index of net reproduction, which
embodies the impact of both fertility and the incidence of child (and adult)
mortality on the rate of population growth.composition is defined for our purposes as the natural logarithm of one plus 
The first component of family
this index of surviving fertility:
f = tn(l + n
C 
/na ),where the number of persons in the family, N, is simply divided between
children and adults, N s n
C 
+ n.
aThe second component of family composition is the logarithm of the
number of adults living together in the family:a= in(n}
a 
The logarithm of family income is then the final or third component of our
measure of personal economic welfare, the logarithm of family per capita
income: 
'ftn(N) • 1n{Y) - tn(n) - tn(l + n /n)a 
which is rewritten as follows: 
c a 
yn ""y - a - f. 
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The variance of the logarithms of family per capita income or income 
"inequality" can then be decomposed into three variance and three co­
variance terms as follows: 
V(yn) ., V(y) + V(a) + V(f) - 2C(y,a) - 2C{y,f) + 2C(a,f) (2) 
where V(.) and C(.,.) represent the variance and covariance of the re­
spective argument(s). Because the adult size and fertility index contribute 
to a reduction in family per capita income, the first two covariance terms 
involving adult size and the fertility index with family income are subtracted 
from the sum of the three component variances. 
The covariance between family income and adult family size and between 
family income and fertility can be e~onomically interpreted as the responsive­
ness of these aspects of family composition to income.· But economic analyses 
of the demand for children and marriage rely heavily on relative price variation 
across populations that is captured in the differences in the shadow value of 
time (or wage rates) of men and women. Furthermore, if investments in children, 
such as schooling, are substitutes for numbers of children, differences in 
fertility may parallel inversely investments in population quality. Hence, 
the next step in elaborating this framework is to distinguish between the 
potential earned income or wage rate of adult males and females, with the 
expectation that female potential income will be inversely related to fertility 
due to the predominance of own-price effects, whereas male income will be 
weakly related to fertility, positively or negatively, depending on a variety 
of factors that determine the magnitude of offsetting income and price 
effects (Schultz, 1976). 
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It is not t.mcommon to focus attention on the covariance between 
family income and total family size, but, as suggested above, this procedure 
may conceal the more interesting relationships between income and the 
subcomponents of family size that represent distinct demands. 
Empirical Illustration: Colombia 1973 
Table 3 reports the means, variances, and covariances of measures 
of unrelated individual and family income and family composition for 
Colombia, stratified by age of head of household. The data are, as before, from a 
four percent public use sample of the noninstitutional questionnaires of 
the October 1973 Population and Housing Census of Colombia (DANE, 1977). 
Only units reporting some income in the month before the Census are 
considered. 
Several empirical regularities may be noted. The number of adults 
per family increases steadily with the age of head, from 2.1 at ages 
15-19 to 3.7 at ages 50-64. 7 The (surviving) fertility index (i.e., 
children per adult) increases from .38 at ages 15-19 to a maximum 1.14 
at ages 35-39, and thereafter falls to .45 in the last age group. The total 
number of persons per family therefore increases rapidly from 2.9 at ages 15-19 
to 5.6 at ages 35-39, and is more or less constant thereafter, as the share 
of adults in the family slowly increases. Family income also increases with 
the age of its head, but at a slower rate than does family size, peaking at 
ages 45-49. Consequently, family per capita income reaches its largest value 
in this cross section for young families whose heads are ages 20-24, and 
declines thereafter until ages 45-49. 
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Family income inequality, or the variance of the logarithms of 
family incomes, increases monotonically with age from 1.05 at age 15-19 to 
1.70 at age 50-64. Family per capita income inequality tends to be 
larger and also increases with age until the age group 35-39, when the 
proportion of children in the family peaks; inequality then varies within 
a narrow range across subsequent age groups. Comparison with column (3) 
of Table 1 indicates that the within cohort variance of log incomes of 
individual men varies by age at a slightly higher level than does family 
per capita income inequality by age in Table 3. 
Adult Family Size and Income 
The first covariance term in the full decomposition, C(y,a), repre­
sents the association between family income and the number of adults liv­
ing together in a family. In a simple regression of the log of family 
income on the log of the number of adults in the family: 
where e in row 8 of Table 3 is the estimate of the elasticity of family1 
income with respect to number of adults in the family.
8 If the propensity of 
adults to live together were not correlated with their potential income 
contribution, their own and that of others in their family, and our measure 
of family income captured fully the sum of the potential income of its adult 
members, then this elasticity would be approximately one. Family incomes 
would then tend to increase in proportion to the number of adults in the family. 
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The Colombian relationship between family income and number of adults 
per family implies approximately a unitary elasticity from age 25-29 to 
50-64, varying from .83 to 1.01. But several factors could explain departures 
of this elasticity from tmity. First, there may be economies of scale in 
household production and thus gains from specialization within the family­
household that encourages some degree of combination and coordination of 
adult activities. Also the production and rearing of children at certain 
stages of the life cycle is an important factor in the combination of adults 
into families in most societies. Technology of production, firm-specific 
training, and information costs of monitoring activities may work to extend 
further the productive limits of the family beyond the nuclear childrearing 
unit. The production determinants of adult family composition is a largely 
unexplored field for theoretical speculation and empirical study 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1979). 
The effect of numbers of adults on family income may also be dis­
torted by imperfect measures of family income or production. Goods and 
services produced and consumed within the family are often omitted from 
measures of family income. The proportion of uonmarket income in the 
family's real total income may vary with number of adults, e.g., in two­
adult families compared with one-adult "families." The propor-tion of 
total income consumed in nonmarket forms may also vary systematically 
over certain periods of the life cycle, such as during the early years 
of childbearing before the first offspring begins to contribute important­
ly to family income. This hypothesis could explain the markedly lower 
values of the adult-income elasticity for families whose heads are between 
the ages of 15 and 24. 
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Just as the composition of income between market and nonmarket 
sources may be affected by the number of adults in the family, the potential 
lifetime wealth or permanent income of individuals may influence the demand 
for goods and services that are more economically produced in larger (or 
smaller) units, or in the market or nonmarket sectors (Kusnic and Davanzo, 
1980). The nuclear family is thought to facilitate childbearing and the 
transmission of productive skills and culture to the young. As more of 
these functions are performed outside of the family, and the share of 
adult lifetimes devoted to childbearing decreases, the need for a permanent 
nuclear family may diminish, or at least that is concluded from some studies 
of modern industrialized societies. As the wages for men and women in the 
marketplace approach equality in some high income countries, the marriage 
gains from specialization in market and nonmarket production are reduced and 
the opportunity cost of single household ''privacy" and mobility may decrease. 
The recent increase in the proportionof single person households· in many 
high income countries may be attributed to the high income elasticity of 
demand for this form of "privacy" (Michael, .!:!_al., 1980). 
In sum, the proportionate relationship between family income and 
number of adults in the family implies that the combination of adults into 
family units is not associated in Colombia with augmenting or diminishing 
appreciably the inequality of family per capita income. This is a relatively 
neutral factor of family composition, except during the early childrearing 
years, ages 15 to 25. During these years parents produce nonmarket income 
in the form of child care services that are excluded from personal income accounts. 
A more comprehensive measure of family income that included household nonmarket 
production and child care services might, therefore, increase the estimated 
income-adult elasticity for these younger age groups, and probably also in-
crease slightly the estimated elasticity at later ages. 
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Fertility and Family Income 
Fertility and family income tend to be inversely related, with the 
associated covariance obtaining a maximum value in the Colo0bian case 
at ages 30~34 (Table 3), and decreasing thereafter slowly to the oldest 
age group. Here the causal relationship is thought to operate primarily 
from the level of family income to the level of fertility, and to be 
achieved th~ough voluntary choice rather than any form of biological 
predisposition. Of course, children may also contribute by their efforts 
to family income, though this positive effect should not be substantial 
until a child is about ten years of age, and,by our measuring convention, 
this child upon reaching age 15 is counted as an adult even though the 
average age at first marriage in Colombia is now eight years later, at 
age 23. The observed negative association at all ages suggests.the level 
. . . 
of surviving fertility systematically declines with increases in family 
income •.Thus, differences in surviving fertility across families in 
-
Colombia increases inequality in family per capita income •. The negative 
covariance between income and fertility never reaches, in absolute value 
terms, the magnitude of the positive covariance between income and adult 
family size, but remains substantial. The collapse of income-fertility 
differentials would reduce overall inequality in family per capita income 
by 12 to 18 percent from ages 20-24 and 45-49. 
In the regression of the logarithm of the fertility index on family 
income: 
the income-fertility elasticity, s2 , is reported in row 9,Table 3, and con­
verted in row 10 into the derivative of change in the number of children 
29per household with respect to a proportionate change in income, evalu­ated at the sample logarithmic means. At ages 30-34 the relationshipsuggests a doubling of family income is associated with a decrease of.50 inn
C 
or an average reduction of one-half of a child from the samplemean of 2.5 children per family. This fertility derivative remains inthe vicinity of -.4 from age 25-29 to 45-49, suggesting a strong inverserelationship from income to fertility at all ages and not one that islimited to the initial timing of childbearing.lo
Again, one suspects that nonmarket income is greater in higher fer­~ility families, but this fact is unlikely to change the conclusion thatdifferential fertility patterns by income classes in Colombia add to theinequality in per capita economic resources in the hands of families.This finding would be less pronounced if children were weighted lessheavily than adults by our "per capita" normalization of family income,but the empirical regularity and the direction of its effect on inequalitywould not thereby be changed. 
The positive family size-family income relationship is insufficientto prevent family per capita income from declining in larger family units.This observation has been stressed in the recent writings of Kuznets (1976,1978). In the case of Colombia in 1973, the inequality increasing effectof the distribution of families by size is due almost entirely to differentlevels of fertility (or the proportion of children among all persons in thehousehold) by income level and is hardly affected at all by the size distri­bution of numbers of adults living together.
Adult Family Size and Fertility 
The third covariance term in our decomposition of per capita family 
income inequality is less readily ascribed an economic interpretation 
and, given its modest size, it will be discussed only briefly here. 
Large collections of adults may be synonymous with extended families. 
It has been hypothesized that extended family structures may lower the 
cost of children and contribute to higher fertility. With more adults 
to coordinate and specialize in home child care activities, for which 
there may exist economies of scale, the opportunity cost of children may 
be reduced. But there is no evidence in support of this hypothesis 
from these data; extended families with more adults are associated with 
somewhat lower levels of fertility per adult. The covariance between 
the logarithm of the fertility index and logarithm of the number of adults 
in the family, C(f,a) in row 7, is about -.03 to -.05 from ages 25-29 to 
45-49. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is essential that we get behind overall measures of individual and 
family income inequality and identify regularities among subcomponents that 
have economic and behavioral meaning. The first part of this paper analyzed 
individual income inequality in three countries, and sought to distinguish 
between inequality directly associated with the age structure of the popu­
lation, that associated with the cross sectional age-income profile, and that 
remaining within age groups. The first two sources of aggregate inequality 
warrant more study, but the issues of equity and economic inequality are 
perhaps most clearly associated with the third component of inequality, that 
which arises within a birth cohort. 
The larger the share of youth, age 14-19, among income recipient units 
the greater is the aggregate log variance in individual incomes in the 
Netherlands and in the United States. Given the currently documented 
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pattern of income inequality within and across age groups, the secular 
trend toward an older age composition in the United States could directly 
account for a decrease of one-third in U.S. individual income inequality 
since the Civil War,as found by Lindert and Williamson (1976). Indirect 
economic effects of changes in age structures should reinforce this extra-
polated trend in income inequality based on direct effects of compositional changes. 
Age structure differences between Colombia and the United States do not 
explain, however, the much greater overall inequality in Colombia. With-
in age group inequality is more than twice as large in Colombia as in the 
United States, while inequality is a third less in the Netherlands than 
in the U.S;, independent of age structure. Comparing income inequality by 
age across populationsis complicated, however, by the different employment 
opportunities open to youth in countries at different levels of development, 
and in particular, family unpaid jobs. The empirical data considered here 
suggest- that the widely observed relationship between modern economic growth 
and decreasing aggregate income inequality may be exaggerated by differences 
in age structures across contemporary populations and over time within more 
industrially and demographically advanced countries. 
The second part of this paper sought to divide family composition into 
two distinct behavioral elements associated with fertility and the propensity 
of adults to live together. The latter adult aspect of family structure may 
in some circumstances respond to income opportunities across the population. 
But in the case of Colombia in 1973, the elasticity of family income with 
respect to number of adults in the family was nearly one, indicating that 
this process was not a major source of inequality in per capita family 
income•. Fertility, on the other hand, was distinctly higher in low income 
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families, adding to the inequality in per capita family income in Colombia. 
Replication of this simple decomposition analysis in other countries at 
different stages in the demographic transition and at different income 
levels might clarify how fertility by family income varies with particular 
patterns of economic growth and with different emphases on education, public 
health and family planning activities. 
The avenues open to research are many. To better understand family 
income inequality, behavioral and institutional causal interpretations are 
needed of component regularities. Micro economic theory, standard techniques 
of statistical decomposition and estimation, and common procedures of 
age and sex stratification may all be useful in advancing this goal. The 
growing public availability of large household surveys and samples of censuses 
for manr countries and time periods provides the opportunity to proceed in 
a variety of directions as explored here, withou~ being limited to standard 
tabulations and income accollll.ting frameworks. Age structures of the income 
recipient population, fertility (and mortality) differences by family income, 
and the market labor supply behavior of women, appear to be essential parts 
to this puzzle. The parts must fit together and add up to a consistent 
whole. The framework that takes form from this research should facilitate 
more precise and meaningful measurement of income inequality than has been 
seen in the past. It should also suggest new approaches to assembling 
these components into a integrated two-level household-aggregate model of 
economic demographic development, one that has been sorely needed since 
Malthus's grand design went wide of the mark a hundred years ago. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1see for example Schultz (1965), Pyatt (1966), and Fei, Ranis 
and Kuo (1978). The log variance of incomes assigns greater weight to 
inequalities among the poor than among the rich, in contrast with the 
Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation, which assign equal 
weights to the same absolute differences in income between rich persons 
and between poor persons. Although rankings of inequality across 
countries or socioeconomic groups tend to be relatively insensitive to 
which of these alternative measures of inequality is adopted (Atkinson, 
1970), the empirical conclusions reported here may not ::.bold_ :for 
other summary measures of inequality. 
2see Rosen (1977) for discussion of an earnings function as a 
structurai equation and as a reduced-form equation. The distinction 
does not seem paramount in this context but is important for the 
economic interpretation of the earnings function and its parameters. 
3Analysis of the divergence of longitudinal age-income profiles 
from cross-sectional age-income profiles for individuals in the United 
States from 1947 to 1970 suggests that secular productivity gains 
have been roughly age-neutral for males age 25-54, for whom the average 
annual hours of work have changed least (Schultz, 1975). 
. 4In one way the measurement of income during the last month helps 
to standardize income for the duration of time worked, and provides a 
better approximation for the wage rate. Consequently, students 
who would work for pay only during summers would be included with 
34 
artificially low incomes in the Dutch and U.S. statistics, but are probably 
excluded from the Colombian Census sample. On the other hand, workers 
who were entirely unemployed last month with no other sources of income 
would be unavoidably excluded from the Colombian sample and might be in­
cluded in the U.S. and Dutch data if they found any employment or received 
any welfare-transfer income during the preceding year. Yet unemployment 
in Colombia is not frequent by conventional standards according to the 
1973 census: two to five percent of men ages 10 to 24 are unemployed. 
Our reliance on the logarithmic variance of incomes to summarize 
income inequality does not permit the retention of persons with no income 
in our sample. But if persons with no income are to be included, the uni­
verse of income recipient units must be defined on new criteria such as 
the individual's labor force status. The disabled, housekeepers, pensioners, 
and discouraged workers who report themselves as being outside of the labor 
force are thereby arbitrarily excluded. It would be preferable to use only 
exogenous characteristics for determining the study population, such as 
sex and age. If men of a specific age were considered, additional problems 
arise of placing a value on outputs of (or inputs into) all household pro­
duction, schooling and training activities. To define a measure of "full" 
income comprehensively as both money market income and the cash value of 
all services and goods consumed or invested in kind involves one in many 
more unresolved conceptual and empirical problems (Kusnic and Davanzo, 1980). 
5Tbis adjustment is performed by regressing the natural logarithm 
of individual income on a series of dummy variables defined over the age 
intervals included in Table 1. By including in this regression a series 
of dummy variables for four levels of education, or a continuous variable 
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for years of education of the individual, we "adjust" the age profile 
estimates for education. The squared deviations of the log income profile 
from the overall mean become: (-).200; (-).005; .027; .110; .216; .203; 
.038, respectively for the age groups. The deviation effects are increased 
for age groups beyond age 30, and decreased for those below age 25. 
6An alternative approach would divide family income by a weighted 
sum of family members, where the weights assigned to different types of 
persons in the family would be dictated by the purposes of the analysis, 
such as the study of consumption or production. For example, it has been 
argued that consumption requirements of a person vary by age and sex. 
Real income available for consumption may tend to be overstated by the 
per capita normalization of family income in families with a relatively 
large number of children, and conversely understated in families with 
disproportionate numbers of adults. An alternative normalization 
scheme could also be examined that assigns weights to children which are 
some variable fraction of those assigned to adults, reflecting crudely 
the lower production potential or consumption requirements of children 
than of adults. 
7References are to antilogs of the means of logarithmic variables 
reported in Table 3. For example, the number of adults per unit, whose 
head is age 50-64 is 3.7 • exp (1.3). 
8The simple regression coefficient in this case, e
1
, is equal to 
the covariance of tnY and tn n, divided by the variance of tn n. Fora a
example, in a family whose head was between the ages of 30 and 34, 
B1 • C(y,a)/V(a) = .179/.177 • 1.01. 
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9one may wonder, however, whether the single loglinear relation­
ship estimated here does not embody several distinct relationships for 
different family sizes and production technologies. More research might 
isoiate whether the relationship that holds from one to two adult 
families continues to fit the data for three, four and five adult families, 
and whether the relationship between family income and number of adults 
per family is the same in populations where the household head is a rural 
landless worker, owner-operator-farmer, urban self employed, or urban wage­
salary employee. 
10
The fertility demand equation could also be viewed as conditioned 
on family income per adult or an average "wage rate", since the elasticity 
of family income with respect to adult size is approximately one. 
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